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The Selling of Put Derivatives by Firms for Shareholder 
Wealth and Information Signaling Enhancement 1 
Abstract 
We define a Synthetic Repurchase Program (SRP) as an open market share 
repurchase program enhanced with sales of put derivatives on the firm’s stock. Firms 
implementing SRPs receive tax-free cash flows. SRPs are shown to be an attractive 
mechanism for value creation that also create, as a byproduct when the transactions are 
disclosed, a separating equilibrium between firms with positive future prospects and the 
rest of the firms. We develop a mathematical model that shows the effectiveness of this 
unique signaling mechanism.  Using data on 53 firms we find that SRPs enhance the 
market’s response to repurchase announcements.  In addition, firms implementing SRPs 
report increases in assets and R&D investments relative to a control sample.  Overall the 
evidence of our research shows that SRPs are effective signals of firm quality and 
perceived as such by the market. 
I. Introduction 
 
Firms have been using put options to enhance their stock repurchase programs since the 
early 1990s. We define a synthetic repurchase program (SRP) as an open market share repurchase 
program enhanced with sales of put derivatives on the firm’s own stock. Financial practitioners 
have exhibited a significant interest in these transactions. Paul Mazzilli at Morgan Stanley & Co. 
reports that "a large portion of the firms that do [share repurchase] programs with me have been 
introduced to [selling put derivatives], and use the strategy.”2  Angel, Gastineau and Weber 
(1997) estimate that more than 10% of all American Stock Exchange firms that have repurchase 
programs use put derivatives in combination with them.  In this paper we investigate why firms 
sell put options on their own stock and do so in combination with stock repurchases in a synthetic 
repurchase program.  
                                                 
1 We would especially like to thank Vladimir A. Atanasov, LeRoy D. Brooks, Jeremy Goh, Michael 
Gombola, Hrsito Gyoshev, Theo Vermaelen.  We would also like to thank Eric J. Higgins, Shawn Howton, 
Hazem Maragah, Edward Nelling, Wei-ling Song, and participants at research seminars at Drexel 
University, Simon Fraser University, Bentley College, Memorial University of Newfoundland, Financial 
Management Association Conference and Eastern Finance Association Conference. We also appreciate the 
useful comments from the participants at the research seminar at the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
 
2 Tom Pratt (1994) 
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A synthetic repurchase program enables management to take greater advantage of 
favorable inside information concerning the firm’s future prospects. When they know that the 
firm’s stock is undervalued, managers can exploit their information advantage and benefit 
shareholders who continue to hold shares by repurchasing shares of the firm’s stock.  Managers 
can take still greater advantage of such private information by buying call options and/or selling 
put options on the firm’s stock. As highly levered transactions, they would significantly magnify 
the profits accruing to shareholders. Moreover, unlike share repurchases, by engaging in option 
transactions, managers are not exploiting their inside information at the expense of existing 
shareholders. Assuming shareholder wealth maximizing behavior on the part of managers, we 
should observe firms buying and selling options on their firm’s stock to a greater extent than they 
repurchase stock.  But, stock repurchases are far more common than option transactions. 
Boards of directors, shareholders, and financial analysts take a dim view of option trading 
by firms for other than hedging purposes.3 Speculative trading is perceived as unnecessarily risky 
and outside of the core competencies of managers. These negative perceptions held by important 
constituents can inhibit managers from using derivatives to fully exploit their inside information. 
However put options nested within a stock repurchase program in a synthetic arrangement can 
mitigate these objections.  Synthetic repurchase programs are viewed as a natural continuation 
and desirable enhancement of a plain vanilla stock repurchase program.   
In a stock repurchase program, the firm determines a share price below which stock 
repurchases are profitable and purchases triggered.  Put options can be sold in conjunction with 
this program where the exercise price of the puts are set at or below the stock repurchase trigger 
price.  Consequently, repurchases of stock obligated by the exercising of puts are purchases that 
would have occurred in the absence of the put option, or so it can be argued.  As the puts are 
placed in the perspective of the repurchase program, the problem of their perceived riskiness is 
                                                 
3 GAAP states that firms should prove that they use their derivatives for hedging otherwise they should be 
classified as derivatives used for speculations. 
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mitigated. And because managers set exercise prices that conform to their inside information, 
firm issued put options almost always expire unexercised.  The sales of the options are said to 
enhance a stock repurchase program as the premiums from the sales are used to repurchase stock 
in the program.  Consequently a SRP also provides a convenient mechanism by which cash flows 
generated by the put sales can be disgorged to shareholders.     
We examine the proposition that managers have incentive to increase the acceptability by 
corporate constituents of their derivative transactions by demonstrating that the selling of put 
options on the firm’s stock has significant value creation potential. We demonstrate this value 
creation potential with a case study showing how Microsoft generated considerable profits in the 
1990 decade with synthetic repurchase transactions. In 1994, Microsoft first sold put derivatives 
on its own stock as part of a synthetic repurchase program and received $49 million in premiums. 
Over a seven year period in which its SPR was in place, Microsoft’s total premiums from its sales 
of puts exceeded two billion dollars. As the premiums are treated as retained earnings, they are a 
tax-free cash flow credited to equity and were used to repurchase shares of Microsoft stock in an 
ongoing stock repurchase program. Recently, in response to the prolonged bear market that began 
in 2000, firms have settled their outstanding puts, at less cost than expected, and placed synthetic 
repurchase programs on hold (Atanoasov, Gyoshev, Szewczyk, Tsetsekos (2001)).  
We also propose that managers have an information signaling motive to combine the 
selling of puts with repurchases of stock in a synthetic repurchase program.  Sales of puts on the 
firm’s stock can convey favorable information about the firm’s future prospects to outside 
investors (Gyoshev (2001) and Gibson, Povel, and Singh (2004)). However, firm-issued puts are 
usually privately placed with financial intermediaries, such as investment banks, rendering the 
transactions unobservable by outside parties. Moreover, the firm is not obligated to disclose the 
transactions by existing Financial Accounting Standard Board accounting rules or required to do 
so by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Atanasov, Gyoshev, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos 
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(2001) find that, for a sample of firms selling put options on their own stock in the period 1994 to 
1999, the average elapsed time from the date of the put transaction to its disclosure to the public 
is six months.4  Such time intervals imply that the put sales themselves did not function as a 
timely disclosure of information.  However, they were sold in the context of a SRP as the put 
premiums received from the sales are said by the firms (in 10Q and 10K statements) were used to 
repurchase common stock of the issuing firms. 
In this paper, we present a model in which managers of financially strong firms create a 
separating equilibrium through sales of puts on the firm’s stock which allows outsiders to 
distinguish their firms from financially weak firms. Firms exploit this separating equilibrium in a 
SRP as the firm’s stock repurchases convey conditional signals conditioned on the establishment 
of a SRP. Information conveyed by a stock repurchase can be ambiguous to the extent that 
uninformed investors are unable to distinguish between share repurchases of undervalued shares 
and share repurchases that disgorge excess operating cash flow.  Such situations are likely to exist 
when firms makes consecutive stock repurchases in an ongoing stock repurchase program. This 
ambiguity is mitigated when the repurchases are made in the context of a SRP as the firm has 
certified its quality – only high value firms will establish synthetic repurchase programs. 5   
We provide evidence of the separating equilibrium using financial profiles of firms with 
SRPs and financial profiles of matched control firms with plain vanilla repurchase programs, and 
matched control firms with no stock repurchase programs. Control firms are matched with SRP 
firms by industry and size.  Relative to the control firms, firms that initiate SRP’s have higher 
market-book ratios, higher earnings and operating cash flows, display significant increases in 
                                                 
4 Rational outside investors would never purchase put options from an informed issuing firm. According to 
Atanasov, Gyoshev, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos (2001) put sales to investment banks involve an implied 
agreement in which banks purchase inside information conveyed by the willingness of firms to sell puts 
and firms agree to withhold announcing the transaction. 
 
5 An interesting feature of this signaling mechanism is that it transmits the signal without wasteful spending 
activity like dividend increases, discussed by John and Williams (1985), or inefficient investments and the 
passing up of positive NPV projects, discussed by Krasker (1986).  
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total assets, and make greater investments in research and development. These finding are 
consistent with the proposition that higher quality firms initiate synthetic repurchase programs. 
We also test the proposition that managers use the separating equilibrium to enhance the 
information content of the firm’s stock repurchases.  We show that signals conveyed by stock 
repurchases conditional on a SRP are associated with larger positive abnormal returns that are 
stock repurchases made outside a SRP.   
The paper is organized as follows. Part 2 demonstrates the value creation potential of 
SRPs with a Microsoft case study showing the huge profits made with synthetic repurchase 
transactions. Part 3 explains the motives for synthetic repurchases. Part 4 explains the market 
reaction to synthetic repurchase programs and Part 5 concludes. 
II. The profitability of synthetic repurchase programs: the case 
of Microsoft Corporation. 
 
Table 1 presents Microsoft Corporation’s experience with its synthetic stock repurchase 
program over the period 1993 through 2002. During this period, Microsoft became one of the 
world’s largest firms and realized the highest net income in the world. The first mention of 
Microsoft’s stock repurchase program is found in its October 1, 1993 10–K statement: “The 
exercise of stock options by employees provides additional cash. Funds received have been used 
to repurchase the Company's common stock on the open market, to provide shares for stock 
option and stock purchase plans. This practice is expected to continue in 1994.”  In 1993, the firm 
repurchased 7 million shares for $250 million. This dollar amount is equal to 26% of net income 
reported for the year.  
 
<Insert Table 1 approximately here>  
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Microsoft initiated its synthetic repurchase program in 1995. As stated in the firm’s June 
30, 1995 10-Q filing: “In connection with the Company's stock repurchase program, put warrants 
were sold to independent third parties during 1995.  The put warrants entitle the holders to sell 
shares of Microsoft common stock to the Company at specified prices.  On June 30, 1995, 8.0 
million warrants were outstanding with a strike price of $69.75 per share.  The warrants expire at 
various dates between February 1996 and November 1996, are exercisable only at maturity, and 
are settleable in cash at Microsoft's option.6  The maximum potential repurchase obligation of 
$405 million has been reclassified from stockholders' equity to put warrants as of June 30, 1995.  
There was no impact on earnings per share in 1995.” 
The program began modestly with $49 million of premiums received from the sale of 
puts representing 7% of the dollar repurchase of stock in 1995 and 3% of net income.  Over the 
next 5 years, Microsoft aggressively exploited the strategy.  In 1998 put premiums received were 
almost equal to 12% of the year’s reported net income.  Put premiums totaled $766 billion and 
contributed more than 25% of the funds used to repurchase stock in 1999.  At the same time, the 
maximum potential repurchase obligation of outstanding put warrants also aggressively 
increased. In 1999, the maximum potential repurchase obligation is estimated at over $10 billion, 
which is equal to 130% of that year’s net income.  However, all options maturing before 2001 
expired unexercised.  
Microsoft’s synthetic stock repurchase program was no longer a viable strategy during 
the prolonged bear market that began in 2000.  In 2001, Microsoft repurchased all unexpired put 
warrants for $1.3 billion dollars.  The firm’s overall experience with synthetic stock repurchases 
was positive. Microsoft started modestly as they experimented with the SRP and learned the 
mechanics and then aggressively exploited the strategy for the last 3 years of the bull market.  
Microsoft was able to timely conclude the strategy by retiring unexercised put warrants at a cost 
                                                 
6 Atanasov, Gyoshev, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos (2001) elaborate why the firms are allowed by the 
Financial Intermediaries to settle before the expiration. 
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far less than their maximum potential obligation. The firm realized a net gain from the strategy of 
$677 billion over seven years.  
III. Why firms sell  put derivatives in share repurchase programs 
 
As evident from the Microsoft case, synthetic repurchase programs enable managers to 
take advantage of their superior information of the firm’s future prospects and collect substantial 
tax-free put premiums.7  The premiums enhance stock repurchase programs as they are 
distributed to shareholders through the repurchase of shares.  On the other hand, the vast majority 
of issued put options expire unexercised, and the buyers of these options, predominantly 
investment banks in private placement transactions with the issuing firm, lose money. Atanasov, 
Gyoshev, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos (2001) propose a model that provides a rationale why an 
uninformed investment bank will trade in put options with an informed issuing firm, given the 
expected profits from the trade are negative for the bank. In their model, trading with an informed 
party can be profitable because the bank can acquire valuable information in a private placement 
purchase of puts and afterwards earn abnormal returns on trades in other securities of the issuing 
firm.  This requires the firm to maintain a “decent interval” in which information regarding the 
transaction is withheld from the public so to allow the bank to make its profitable trades.  The 
firm does so in order to continue its profitable transacting in puts with the investment bank. 8 
Given that firms receive substantial cash receipts from put sales and that issued put 
options expire unexercised, the primary motivation for selling puts is quite clear – these 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 Grullon and Ikenberry’s (2000) claim that the reason firms use put options is that “in the US the premium 
is not taxable and falls directly to the bottom line”  
  
8 Firms are limited in their ability to profit from their information advantage by selling puts on organized 
exchanges as Rule 10b-18 restricts the amount of puts a firm can issue.  Moreover, rational outside 
investors will never purchase put options from an informed issuing firm. According to Atanasov, Gyoshev, 
Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos (2001) put sales to investment banks involve an implied agreement in which 
banks purchase inside information conveyed by the willingness of firms to sell puts and firms agree to 
withhold announcing the transaction.  As the transactions are off-market, the firm is not restricted in the 
number of puts it can sell, nor is it obligated to disclose the transactions by existing accounting rules. 
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transactions increase shareholders’ wealth. However, a consequential byproduct of issuing puts is 
that a separating equilibrium is created that allows investors to separate the issuing firms from 
those of lower value.  But, the circumstances in which firms sell puts whereby the puts are 
privately placed and announced months after the sale, indicate that put sales are not used by firms 
to directly signal information. Yet firms can still take advantage of the resulting separating 
equilibrium associated with put sales. By establishing an integrated program of put sales and 
stock repurchases, a condition is created in which the separating equilibrium increases the 
effectiveness of signals conveyed by stock repurchases made within a synthetic repurchase 
program.    
   We present a model in which a high-value firm uses the inverse relation between the 
put payoff and the underlying firm stock effectively signal and certify its quality.9  Put 
derivatives issued by a high-value firm at a fair price with respect to the publicly available 
information will be overpriced, and put derivatives issued by low-value firms at a fair price with 
respect to the publicly available information will be underpriced. The difference in the “fair” 
intrinsic value, based on insider information, establishes a separating equilibrium between the 
high-value and the low-value firms. By extension, only high-value firms initiate synthetic 
repurchase programs, and stock repurchases within the program are conditional signals of quality. 
We graphically present the model in the next section. We provide a rigorous proof in the 
appendix. 
IV. Graphical Presentation of the Model 
Without loss of generality, we assume that firms issuing puts will be offered the fair-
market put premium based on publicly available information. However, prior to initiating a 
synthetic repurchase program, only managers know whether their firm is financially strong or 
                                                 
9 Nachman and Noe (1994) show that if there is not a inverse relation between the securities issued, i.e., a 
firm is limited to issuing securities with non-decreasing payoffs, then there cannot not be a separating 
equilibrium between good and bad firms.  That is, a firm can always mimic the security issuing behavior of 
a good firm without negative impact on the bad firm shareholders value. 
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financially weak. Uninformed investors will assume that all firms have the same probability 
distribution of stock prices at put expiration. Without loss of generality, we assume that put 
options are traded only in firms for which non-performance is not expected at put expiration.  
We can also assume without loss of generality that at the moment the put option is 
written there are three stochastically dominant distributions that will represent the probability 
function of the stock price at put option expiration. These three distributions are the distribution 
of financially strong firms, the distribution of financially weak firms, and the expected 
distribution of the stock price at put expiration from the uninformed investors’ perspective. The 
normal distribution is a subset of the stochastic dominance distributions. But, without loss of 
generality we can assume for this example that the three distributions of the stock price at put 
expiration are normal distributions with different means and have the same standard deviation 
which, given the assumption that non-performance is not expected at expiration, are smaller that 
the smallest mean, as shown on Figure 2. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 approximately here>  
 
<Insert Figure 3 approximately here>  
 
The difference between an exchange-traded put option and a put option written by a firm 
is the default risk of the underlying firm. As shown in Figure 3, in the case of an exchange-traded 
put option, when the stock price of the firm falls, the put option goes  deeper into the money (the 
X line), and the exchange guarantees payment through its clearing house, i.e., provides 
“insurance” in case of default of the firm. But when a put option is written by a firm, there is a 
risk of default (P line). If the stock price of the firm drops, there is a point at which the total value 
of the firm will be paid to the put holder as a settlement payment. Below this point, (under $30 
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dollars per share in Figure 3) the firm will default, and the put holders will not be properly 
compensated, unlike the holders of exchange-traded puts (represented by Line X). 
Now, consider this from the perspective of the stockholders (S line).  There is a point 
under which the claim of the stockholders has zero value, and the firm will go bankrupt (under 
$30 dollars per share in Figure 3). When the stock price is between this point and the put option 
exercise price, some of the value of the firm will accrue to stockholders and some to the put-
holders (between $30 and $60 dollars per share in Figure 3). Finally, when the stock price is 
above the put option strike price (above $60 dollars in Figure 3), shareholders keep the entire 
value of the firm for themselves. And, for comparison, if there is no (SRP) sale of put options, 
shareholders keep everything for themselves independently of the stock price distribution (T 
line). 
To assess the signaling effect of the issue of a put option (SRP) by a financially weak or 
financially strong firm, we have to find the put premiums: for financially strong and financially 
weak firms and for firms from the uniformed investor perspective. The difference between the 
integrals of stockholder value at put expiration with the put option sold (Line S) and without the 
put option sold (Line T) give the expected put value at expiration for the firm that chooses to sell 
put options. To find these three put premiums, we integrate the difference between the 
stockholder value at put expiration with the put option sold (S line from Figure 3) and the 
stockholder value at put expiration without the put option sold (T line from Figure 3) over the 3 
three stochastic dominance distributions presented in Figure 2: the distribution at put expiration 
for financially strong firms (S line in Figure 2), the distribution at put expiration for financially 
weak firms (W line in Figure 2), and the distribution at put expiration for average firms from the 
uninformed investor perspective (A line in Figure 2).  
 
<Insert Figure 4 approximately here>  
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The values of the six integrals are presented graphically in Figure 4. The value is the area 
below the curve. So, the values of the put option premiums are the areas between the two 
corresponding curves. For the average firm, i.e., for any firm from an uninformed investor 
perspective, the put premium paid should be equal to the area between the two lines, the line 
received by integrating the value of the firm without put options sold (T line from Figure 3) over 
the stochastic dominance distribution of stock prices at put expiration for the average firm (A line 
from Figure 2) and the line received by integrating the value of the firm with put options sold (S 
line from Figure 3) over the stochastic dominance distribution of stock prices at put expiration for 
the average firm (A line from Figure 2). This is the area between the lines A and AP in Figure 4.  
This is the put premium that exactly compensates the average firms for selling put options.10 The 
put premiums for financially strong firms and financially weak firms are computed in exactly the 
same way using correspondingly: the stochastic dominance distribution of stock prices at put 
expiration for the financially strong firm (S line from Figure 2), and the stochastic dominance 
distribution of stock prices at put expiration for the financially weak firm (W line from Figure 2). 
There is almost no difference between the value of a good firm, that has sold put options 
and a good firm that has not sold a put option and the area between this two curves representing 
the fair value of the put premium (lines S and SP in Figure 4). This value is only known to the 
management of the firm before the introduction of the SRP with the sale of puts. Furthermore, the 
option premium received form the company which is the put premium for average firms is much 
greater than the difference between the expected values for financially strong firm at put 
expiration. Therefore, it is advantageous for good firms to sell overvalued put options to 
investment banks. 
                                                 
10 Furthermore, there is a small additional tax-benefit for the firm, because taxes due are figured into the 
valuation of the put, but the put premium is, in fact, tax-free. So there is small tax-advantage for an average 
firm to issue put options. 
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There is a huge difference between the expected value of a financially weak firm that has 
sold put options to falsely certify its quality and a financially week firm that has chosen not to 
mimic the certifying behavior of good firms (lines W and WP in Figure 4). The put premium 
received is much smaller and could not compensate the firm for the risk involved. 
A simpler way of computing the put premiums for the three companies (financially weak, 
average firm and financially strong) is to integrate what the put holder is going to get at put 
expiration (P line in Figure 3) 11 over the three statistic dominance distributions. 
 
<Insert Figure 5 approximately here>  
 
The large difference between the three put premiums of financially strong firms, average 
firms and financially weak firms creates a separating equilibrium between the financially strong 
and financially weak firms. Financially strong firms are rewarded for selling put options and 
certifying their quality, while financially weak firms will choose not to participate, because of the 
large expected financial penalties for them. This is a unique way of signaling. On one side, the 
signaling firm is communicating its strong financial future and at the same time is receiving tax-
free cash-flows for certifying its quality. On the other side it is extremely expensive to mimic for 
the financially weak firm. 
V. The Separating Equilibrium and Synthetic Repurchase 
Programs 
In practice, puts are sold privately by firms to institutional investors and are not publicly 
reported until months later in the firm’s 10-Q and 10-K reports. Put sales are not intended as 
timely signals of quality. But when reported, the resulting separating equilibrium will endure 
                                                 
11 take into account that the put option is written by a firm so there is default risk 
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through the expiration date of the puts. The separation equilibrium confers an additional benefit 
as firms having new favorable information can signal this information conditioned on the quality 
certification from their put sales. We posit that firms initiate synthetic repurchase programs to 
take advantage of the separating equilibrium from their sales of puts. 
  Firms may repurchase shares that its managers know are undervalued by the market.  
Firms may also repurchase shares to disgorge excess operating cash flow resulting from a dearth 
of investment opportunities.  Announcements of stock repurchases are ambiguous signals to the 
extent that investors cannot distinguish between the two situations.  This may especially be the 
case when the firm makes consecutive stock repurchases as in a stock repurchase program. This 
ambiguity is reduced when the repurchases are made in the context of a SRP as the firm has 
certified its quality as a high quality firm and such firms are less likely to have excess cash flow 
because of a lack of valuable growth opportunities.  Firms reinforce the connection between put 
sales and stock repurchases in a synthetic repurchase program by conspicuously repurchasing 
shares with cash raised from the put premiums.  Moreover, investors may also find it noteworthy 
that a significant volume of the firm’s share repurchases are being financed with funds from the 
firm’s put sales and not with operating cash flow. 
III.B. Empirical tests 
In the case example of Microsoft, we show that the generation of tax-free put premiums 
from sales of put derivatives is a wealth creating opportunity. Consequently, managers have 
incentive to make their put sales more acceptable to corporate constituencies such as to the firm’s 
board of directors. Put sales made in the context of synthetic repurchase programs are viewed  by 
these constituencies as a natural continuation and desirable enhancement of an existing stock 
repurchase program. We also propose that managers have an information enhancement motive for 
creating synthetic repurchase programs as they allow investors to differentiate between firms that 
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are repurchasing undervalued shares and firms that are disgorging excess cash via share 
repurchases.  
To test this proposition, we first demonstrate that sales of puts create a separating 
equilibrium that separates high quality firms from those of lower quality.  We examine financial 
profiles of firms with synthetic repurchase programs to determine whether such firms differ in 
their future prospects from control samples consisting of firms with plain vanilla repurchase 
programs and firms with no repurchase programs. We then test whether synthetic repurchase 
programs, by creating a signal conditioned on the separating equilibrium, enhance the information 
efficiency of consecutive stock repurchases made in an ongoing repurchase program.   We 
compare announcement period stock price reactions to consecutive stock repurchases made 
outside and within a firm’s synthetic repurchase program.  
IV.A. Data 
We identify firms that sold put options on their own stock over the period from January 
1988 through December 1999 by searching 10-K and 10-Q statements available on the Lexis®-
Nexis® database and on the SEC EDGAR filings database.12  We found 53 firms that used their 
own stock as the underlying asset in the issue of put derivatives. In all cases, the put sales were 
made in connection with an ongoing stock repurchase program. These 53 firms operate in 34 
industries as indicated by their four-digit SIC codes.  We use the SDC Platinum database to 
collect a sample of open market stock repurchases made by the 53 firms.  We attempted to find 
all repurchase announcements made since the initiations of the firms’ stock repurchase programs 
through December 1999. They include the initial repurchase announcements and all subsequent 
                                                 
12 The period encompasses the years over which firms are actively selling puts on their own stocks. We 
terminate our search period in 1999 for two reasons. First, the financial profiles we examine are constructed 
for five years following the initial announcement of a synthetic repurchase program.  Second, firms 
suspended their programs with the development of the prolong bear market beginning in 2000 (see 
Atanasov, Gyoshev, Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (2001) ).  
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repurchase announcements made before and during the upgrade of these programs to synthetic 
repurchase programs as well as announcements made after the termination of a program.   We 
find a total of 189 stock repurchase announcements made by these firms. 
IV.B. Financial Profiles 
We examine the financial profiles of firms with synthetic repurchase programs in 
comparison with two sets of industry/size matched control firms. These control sets consists of 
firms with plain-vanilla stock repurchase programs and firms without stock repurchase programs. 
For each of the 53 firms with synthetic repurchase programs, using COMPUSTAT, we construct 
a list of firms having the same 4-digit SIC code as the synthetic repurchase firm.  Firm size is 
measured as the market value of equity.  The market values of the firms are calculated using data 
obtained from CRSP for the end of the quarter before the synthetic repurchase firm begins to sell 
put options on its own stock.  
Firms with ongoing share repurchase programs are identified using SDC Platinum.  For 
each synthetic repurchase firm, we find the three firms with plain-vanilla repurchase programs 
within the 4-digit SIC group having size closest to that of the synthetic repurchase firm. Likewise, 
we also find the 3 firms closest by size to the synthetic repurchase firm that have no repurchase 
programs.  This procedure gives a control set consisting of 122 industry-and-size-matched firms 
that have ongoing stock repurchase programs and another control set with 122 industry-and-size-
matched firms with no stock repurchase programs.13 Financial profiles of the firms are developed 
using accounting data found in COMPUTSTAT. Year 0 is defined as the year in which the 
synthetic repurchase firms begin selling puts in support or their stock repurchase programs.  
Synthetic repurchase firms and control firms are matched by size at Year 0 and the three 
                                                 
13 The number of control firms is less than 159 because several of the synthetic repurchase firms share  
matched firms in common as they fall in the same 4-digit SIC industry and are similar in size. It is possible 
that some OMRP firms may have non-disclosed SRPs. If so, this would reduce the statistical significance 
of our reported results. 
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portfolios have the same average firm size in Year 0.  Therefore, we do not adjust reported means 
for a Year 0 size benchmark. 14 
Table 2 reports mean earnings before interest & taxes (EBIT) for the three sets of firms.  
We calculate mean EBIT for each year over a 11-year period centered on Year 0.  We test the 
statistical significance of the difference in means between the sets of firms.  For each set, we also 
test the difference between the mean EBIT reported for Year –5 and Year 0 and between the 
difference reported between Year 0 and Year 5. 
 
<Insert Table 2 approximately here>  
 
As shown in Table 2, the differences in the means of earnings between synthetic 
repurchase firms and plain-vanilla repurchase firms are not significantly different at the 0.05 level 
for the years preceding Year 0.  However, synthetic repurchase firms have significantly higher 
earnings following their initiation of their synthetic repurchase programs.  Increases in earnings 
between Year –5 and Year 0 and between Year 0 and Year 5 are statistically significant for the 
synthetic repurchase firms. Interestingly, they are not statistically significant for plain-vanilla 
repurchase firms or for firms without repurchase programs. The results in Table 2 indicate that 
firms with synthetic repurchase programs are associated with increasing earnings over time and 
higher levels of earnings relative to firms with plain-vanilla repurchase programs. 
 
<Insert Table 3 approximately here>  
 
Table 3 reports mean total assets for each of the years surrounding Year 0.  As shown in 
the table, the mean total assets for each of the three sets of firms are statistically the same for 
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Year 0, and no significant differences in mean total assets are reported between the sets for the 
years preceding Year 0. Moreover, all three sets of firms show no significant increase in their 
total assets between Year –5 and Year 0. However, synthetic repurchase firms significantly 
increase their assets after initiating sales of puts and show significantly higher levels of assets 
relative to the control firms over Years 1 through 5. We checked COMPUSTAT to determine 
whether increases in cash and cash equivalents are primarily responsible for the higher levels of 
total assets reported for the synthetic repurchase firms. We found no evidence that the increases 
in mean total assets can be explained by increases in cash and cash equivalents. 
 
<Insert Table 4 approximately here>  
 
Table 4 reports mean research and development (R&D) expenses for the three sets of 
sample firms.  Synthetic repurchase firms show no statistically significant differences in R&D 
expenditures relative to plain-vanilla repurchase firms over years –5 through –2 (but significantly 
greater than matched firms without repurchase programs) at the 0.05 level.  However, in the years 
0 through 5, synthetic repurchase firms have significantly higher levers of R&D expenditures 
than do both sets of matched control firms.   
The evidence in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that firms having synthetic repurchase programs 
make significant investments after initiating the selling of puts. The higher level of R&D 
expenditures compared to control firms suggest that these firms make investments in growth 
opportunities. Moreover, the highly uncertain outcomes of R&D can make them difficult for 
outside investors to value and thereby increase the information content of put sales.  Synthetic 
repurchase firms also report higher earnings, in general, than do firms with plain vanilla 
repurchase programs subsequent to their selling puts.  The results enhance the Nohel and Tarhan 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Adjusting for subsequent years’ size would understate the performance measures for high performing 
firms and overstate the performance measures for low performing firms. 
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(1998) findings that show that operating performance following synthetic repurchase improves in 
high-growth firms. We find plain vanilla repurchase firms report no significant increases in 
earning and in total assets, on average, over the period in which the synthetic repurchase firms are 
selling puts.  These finding are consistent with the argument that synthetic repurchase programs 
enable investors to distinguish between firms that are repurchasing undervalued shares and firms 
that are distributing excess cash through share repurchases.  
IV.C. Stock Price Reactions to Repurchase Announcements: 
Event Period Abnormal Returns 
 
To test whether synthetic repurchase programs increase the information efficiency of 
stock repurchases, we examine stock returns in four different event windows into which we 
assign the stock repurchase announcements made by firms with synthetic repurchase programs.15 
The first event window is the Initial Repurchase Announcement Prior to the Synthetic Window, 
which represents the first announcement of a “plain vanilla” open market repurchase program by 
firms that, at a later time, subsequently initiated a synthetic repurchase program. 
The second event window - Subsequent Repurchase Announcements Prior to the 
Synthetic Repurchase Window – contains an aggregation of all “plain vanilla” open market 
repurchase announcements after the firm’s initial repurchase announcement but prior to the 
initiation of the synthetic repurchase program.  
The third window - Repurchase Announcements during Synthetic Repurchase Window - 
represents repurchase announcements made over the duration of synthetic repurchase program.  
The fourth window - Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic Repurchase 
Window - represents repurchase announcements made after the termination of a synthetic 
repurchase program. 
                                                 
15 No press releases or Wall Street Journal announcements can be found for the start of the synthetic 
repurchase programs. Moreover, sales of puts are revealed much later after they are completed, usually in 
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On average, there is a five-year interval between the first stock repurchase announcement 
in the repurchase program and the initial sale of puts that initiates the synthetic repurchase 
program. We found 38 initial stock repurchase announcements and 35 subsequent repurchase 
announcements prior to the start of the synthetic repurchase program.  Twenty-two firms 
terminated their synthetic repurchase programs over the time period examined.  The average time 
period between the initial sale of puts and the termination of the program for these firms is 2 
years. We found 108 repurchase announcements over the time when the firms have an on-going 
synthetic repurchase program and 8 announcements made after the termination of a synthetic 
program. 
We use a standard market model event study methodology to measure abnormal returns 
to announcements of stock repurchases. Announcement period abnormal returns are measured 
over a 2-day window encompassing days 0 to 1 in event time, where day 0 is the initial 
announcement of the repurchase reported in the SDC Platinum database. The market model is 
estimated over a 120 trading-day estimation period beginning on Day –120 and ending on Day -1.  
The CRSP Equally Weighted Index is used to proxy the market portfolio.  
A significant positive average abnormal return is expected for the initial repurchase 
announcements. As previous research demonstrated, the first repurchase announcement in a series 
of stock repurchases constituting the firm’s repurchase program significantly reduces the 
asymmetric information between the management of the firm and market participants. 
Less significant to zero average abnormal returns are expected for repurchase 
announcements following the initial repurchase but made before the synthetic repurchase 
program initiation.  The reason is that the main positive signal of the repurchase program has 
been transmitted to the market by the initial repurchase announcement.  Moreover, the subsequent 
stock repurchase made periodically in the ongoing repurchase program can be ambiguous signals 
                                                                                                                                                 
10-Q or 10-K statements; For these reason, an event study on the initiation of synthetic purchase programs 
and on the sale of puts could not be performed. 
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as some repurchases could be timed trades and others may disgorge excess cash due to a dearth of 
investment opportunities. 
To the extent that upgrading an open market repurchase program to a synthetic 
repurchase programs enables investors to better identify firms that are timing repurchases of 
undervalued shares, a significant positive average abnormal return is expected for repurchase 
announcements made during the duration of a synthetic repurchase program.  If synthetic 
repurchase programs are strongly associated with firms with good future prospects, the 
termination of the program can inform investors of an unfavorable reassessment of the firm’s 
future growth opportunities. There are two possible expected market responses to subsequent 
repurchase announcements.  The market response may revert to the less significant to zero 
average abnormal returns expected for repurchase announcements following the firm’s initial 
repurchase.  On the other hand, the termination of the synthetic repurchase program may 
negatively alter how the market views repurchases made by the firm.  Subsequent stock 
repurchases may be considered disgorging of excess cash and provide additional unfavorable 
information regarding the firm’s future prospects. Consequently, a negative to zero average 
abnormal return is expected for repurchase announcements made after the termination of the 
synthetic repurchase program.  
The results of the event tests are summarized in Table 5 and displayed graphically in 
Figure 1.  The pattern across event windows is as predicted.  As expected, a statistically 
significant positive average abnormal return of 1.94% is reported for initial repurchase 
announcements (z-statistic = 2.34). The average abnormal return for subsequent announcements 
made prior to the sale of puts are positive but not statistically significant (0.603%, z-statistic = 
1.47).  These findings are consistent with the argument that the first repurchase announcement in 
a series of stock repurchases is the principal signal that significantly reduces the asymmetric 
information between management of the firm and market participants. 
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<Insert Table 5 approximately here>  
 
<Insert Figure 1 approximately here>  
 
A strong positive average abnormal return of 1.23% which is positive at the 0.01 level (z-
statistic = 3.87) is found for announcements of stock repurchases made as part of an ongoing 
synthetic repurchase program. These results are consistent with the argument that synthetic 
repurchase programs enhance the informational efficiency of repurchase announcements made by 
firms with good future prospects.  On the other hand, a negative but statistically insignificant 
average abnormal return (-1.496%, z-statistic = 0.01) is recorded for repurchase announcements 
made after termination of synthetic repurchase programs.  These results are consistent with the 




A considerable amount of attention and concern is given to the use of derivatives by 
firms. In this paper, we examine why firms sell put options on their own stock and do so in 
conjunction with an ongoing stock repurchase program in an arrangement we define as a 
synthetic repurchase program.  We demonstrate the wealth creation potential of synthetic 
repurchase programs through the example of Microsoft Corporation, which collected over $2 
billion in tax-exempt premiums from the sale of puts over a seven year period. These premiums 
were used to enhance Microsoft’s stock repurchase program as the cash were used to repurchase 
shares and are thus distributed to shareholders. Managers have considerable incentive to exploit 
the potential of put transactions. We believe that value creation is the primary motivation for 
SRPs but we find that there is a secondary consequence in which a separating equilibrium is 
established if the transactions of puts are disclosed.  
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Disclosures of put transactions in synthetic repurchase programs allow investors to 
identify firms with good future prospects. We provide a model in which synthetic repurchase 
programs create a separating equilibrium between firms with good future prospect and firms 
without good future prospect. We empirically demonstrate that firms that have initiated synthetic 
repurchase programs experience significantly higher earnings than control firms that have 
repurchase programs not enhanced by sales of puts and firms that have no repurchase programs. 
Firms with synthetic repurchase programs also make greater investments in R&D.  And they 
significantly increase their total assets after initiating their synthetic repurchase programs. 
We present evidence that synthetic repurchase programs alter the market’s reaction to 
stock repurchase announcements.  Abnormal returns following stock repurchase announcements 
are more strongly favorable and significant subsequent to the initiation of a synthetic repurchase 
program.  Moreover, repurchase announcements made after the termination of a SRP are negative 
but not statistically significant. These finding suggest that by certifying the future prospects of the 
firm, SRP can be an effective signaling mechanism.  
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VI. Appendix: Model of the separating equilibrium achieved through SRP: 
Stochastic Dominance Distribution of Good and Bad Firms Allowing 
Separating Equilibrium through Put Derivatives 
 
VI.A. Mathematical Prove of the Model: Payoffs to financially strong and 
financially weak firms from engaging in SRP 
 
Both financially strong and financially weak firms will get 0 if they don’t initiate SRP 
(i.e. don’t sell put options). Therefore, the firms will sell put options only if the premium they 
will get is larger than the value of the put option computed given their private information. We 
denote this condition as condition (A). 
We denote the function of cash settlement for put options sold on organized exchange (no 
incorporated credit risk) at put expirations with h(price): 
h (price) =  X – Sp   for Sp < X   (A1) 
   0   for Sp > X 
where X is the strike price of the put and Sp is the stock price at put expiration. We denote the 
function of cash settlement for existing underlying firm sold put option (with incorporated credit 
risk) at put expirations with g(price). 
g (price) =  Total Firm Value for Sp < Y   (A2) 
X – Sp   for Y < Sp < X 
   0   for Sp > X 
where X is the strike price of the put, Sp is the stock price at put expiration and Y is the break 
even price at which all firm assets will be submitted to the put holder as settlement for the put.  
For Sp = Y the firm will declare bankruptcy. This will be done when the total assets of the firm 
are equal to B = X – Y. The put premium for financially strong firms is equal to: 
)()(*)(Pr_
0
pricedpricegpricefemiumPut FSFS ∫∞= ,   (3) 
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where fFS(price) is the probability distribution functions (pdf) of the prices of financially strong 
firm. The put premium for financially weak firms is equal to: 
∫∞=
0
)()()(Pr_ pricedpricegpricefemiumPut FWFW ,   (4) 
where fFW(price) is the probability distribution functions (pdf) of the prices of financially weak 
firm. And the put premium for the average firm, i.e., for any firm from an uninformed investor 
perspective, is equal to: 
∫∞=
0
)()()(Pr_ pricedpricegpricefemiumPut AA ,    (5) 
where fA(price) is the probability distribution functions (pdf) of the prices of average firm, i.e., for 
any firm from an uninformed investor perspective i.e. the unconditional pdf of the price of the 
average firm, given that the public cannot distinguish firm types. 
Without loss of generality we could assume that put options are going to be traded only 
for firms which have Y < E(Sp) i.e. for which Y, the breakeven point, is smaller than the Expected 
Stock price at put expiration, i.e. firms which are not expected to be bankrupt at put expiration. 
We denote this condition as condition (B). Also, without loss of generality, for simplification of 
the computations presented here, we can assume that the three stochastic dominance distributions 
have increasing means and the same standard deviations that are smaller than the minimal of the 
means. We denote this condition as condition (C). 
  FSAFW µµµ <<<0        (6) 
  FWFSAFW µσσσ <==<0       (7) 
 We denoted by PFS the payoff from SRP (the sale of put options) for financially strong 
firms and we denote PFW the payoff from SRP (the sale of put options) for financially weak firms. 
Therefore, taking into account condition (A) the payoffs for the financially strong firms and 
correspondingly for financially weak firms will be. 
Page   25
PFS = max [0, Put_Premium A – (Value put | Type = FS)]  (8) 
PFW = max [0, Put_Premium A – (Value put | Type = FW)]  (9) 
i.e. the firms management will initiate SRP (i.e. sell put options) only if they are expecting 
positive expected net present value (NPV) of the put sale cash flows (CF). If there is a negative 
expected NPV CF they company will chose not to participate. 
VI.A.1. Necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium 
In order for a separating equilibrium to exist and be unique, the following sets of 
individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints have to be satisfied 
for both firm types: 
IR(FS): PFS ≥ 0       (10) 
IR(FW): PFW ≥ 0       (11) 
IC(FS): PFS ≥ The payoff for a financially strong firm if it 
pretends to be financially weak firm   (12) 
IC(B): PFW ≥ The payoff for a financially weak firm if it  
pretends to be financially weak firm   (13) 
VI.A.2. Resulting equilibrium 
Without loss of generality we could assume that every firm that has a highly liquid 
market in derivatives could sell European-style out-of-the money put options with a long maturity 
for a put premium that is equal to put premium for the average firm i.e. to (5). The interpretation 
of equation (5) is that the company receives a fair price for the put options given the public 
information that all market participants have about the future distribution of stock prices. 
Applying conditions (B) and (C) of function f(price) to the shape of function g(price) we 
get that the following condition about firm type is true for any price > 0: 
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dppgpfdppgpfdppgpf FSAFW ∫∫∫ ∞∞∞ >>
000
)()()()()()(   (14) 
The interpretation of this condition is that the financially strong firms are with better than 
average prospects and it is more likely for them to have higher stock prices at put expiration in 
the future than the average firms. And also, the average firms are with better prospects than 
financially weak firms and it is more likely for them to have higher stock prices in the future than 
the financially weak firms. The type of the firm is private information of the management of the 
firms. The investors have an unconditional cumulative distribution of the future stock price of the 
average firm that in a stochastic sense is dominated by the distribution of the financially strong 
firms, and dominates the distribution of financially weak firms. 
VI.A.3. Solution: 
Given the stochastic dominance condition (14), it turns out that: 
(I).  The individual rationality constraint for financially strong firm coincides with the 






Pr_)()(*)()()(*)(Pr_ FSFSAA emiumPutpdpgpfpdpgpfimiumPut       (15) 
This condition directly follows from equations (3), (5) and (14). 
(II). The individual rationality constraint for financially weak firm coincides with the 






Pr_)()(*)()()(*)(Pr_ FWFWAA emiumPutpdpgpfpdpgpfimiumPut     (16) 
Similar to (I) this condition directly follows from equations (4), (5) and (14). 
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When we combine conditions (15) and (16) we receive that: 
FWAFS mPut_PremiumPut_PremiumPut_Premiu <<    (17) 
This assures that only firms of type A will sell put options. Financially strong firms have 
positive private information about their future performance. The true value of the put options 
computed using their private information is lower than the market value without private 
management information. Therefore, financially strong firms will sell overvalued puts and earn 
positive profits. On the other hand, financially weak firms have private information that their 
performance will be less than average. The value of the put option computed using their private 
information will be higher than the premium computed using only publicly known information. 
As a consequence, there exists a unique separating equilibrium.  
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Figure 1: A summary of the market model event study findings 
Synthetic Repurchase Firms is the set of 53 firms that have reported synthetic repurchase programs;  
 
Windows Examined represent several event windows in which we assign the open market repurchase announcement to examine 
SRP; Initial Repurchase Announcement Prior to the Synthetic Window represents the first announcement of an “plain vanilla” 
open market repurchase program by firms that subsequently were involved in a synthetic program; Subsequent Repurchase 
Announcements Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase Window represents all subsequent repurchase announcements that firms have 
made prior to the synthetic window. This is an aggregation of all “plain vanilla” open market repurchase announcements before the 
initiation of the synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. This are new announcements of either continuation and 
enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs 
from firms that have already done a repurchase; Repurchase Announcements During Synthetic Repurchase Window represents all 
new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a 
completely new open market repurchase programs for the duration of synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives; 
Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic Repurchase Window represents new announcements of either continuation 
and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase 
programs after the termination of a SRP. 
 # of observations is the number of observations for each event window; Average Abnormal Return is the market-model risk-
adjusted average abnormal return; Median Abnormal Return is the market-model risk-adjusted median abnormal return; 
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Figure 2: Expected distribution of financially strong and financially weak firms at put expiration 
 
Expected Stock Price at Put Expiration: is how much is the probability that particular stock price will realize at put expiration; S -- Financially 
Strong Firm: is firm for which the management knows that their firm is going to have more than expected positive future prospects; W—
Financially Weak Firm: are firms for which the management knows that their firm is not going to have less than expected positive future 
prospects; A -- Stock Price Distribution From Uninformed Investor Prospective: Investors will assume that all firms have the same probability 
distribution of stock prices at put expiration; PDF is the probability distribution functions (pdf) of the stock price distributions at put expiration;  
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Figure 3: Stakeholder value at put expiration 
 
Expected Stock Price at Put Expiration is how much is the probability that particular stock price will realize at put expiration; Claimholder 
Value at Put Expiration is how much the different claimholders will get at put expiration; T -- Total Firm Value is how much a stockholder will 
get if the company does not sell put options; X -- Exchange Traded Put Profile is how much a holder of an exchange traded put will get at put 
expiration (this put does not have a credit risk); P -- Put holder Pie is how much a holder of firm issued put will get at put expiration (the credit 
risk of the issuing firm is implied in the prices); S -- Stockholder Pie is the amount left for a stockholder of firm which have sold put options on 
their stock. 
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Figure 4: Expected firm value at put expiration 
 
Firms Stock Price at Put Expiration: is how much is the stock price at put expiration; S -- Financially Strong Firm: is firm for which the 
management knows that their firm is going to have more than expected positive future prospects and the firm has sold a put option on their stock; 
W—Financially Weak Firm: are firms for which the management knows that their firm is not going to have less than expected positive future 
prospects and the firm has sold a put option on their stock; A -- Stock Price Distribution From Uninformed Investor Prospective: Investors 
will assume that all firms have the same probability distribution of stock prices at put expiration and the firm has sold a put option on their stock; 
SP -- Financially Strong Firm w/o the Put: is firm for which the management knows that their firm is going to have more than expected positive 
future prospects and the firm has not sold a put option on their stock; WP -- Financially Weak Firm w/o the Put: are firms for which the 
management knows that their firm is not going to have less than expected positive future prospects and the firm has not sold a put option on their 
stock; AP -- Stock Price Distribution From Uninformed Investor Prospective w/o the Put: Investors will assume that all firms have the same 
probability distribution of stock prices at put expiration and the firm has not sold a put option on their stock; 
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Figure 5: Expected put value at put expiration 
 
Stock Price at Put Expiration: is how much is the stock price at put expiration; S -- Financially Strong Firm: is firm for which the management 
knows that their firm is going to have more than expected positive future prospects; W—Financially Weak Firm: are firms for which the 
management knows that their firm is not going to have less than expected positive future prospects; A -- Stock Price Distribution From 
Uninformed Investor Prospective: Investors will assume that all firms have the same probability distribution of stock prices at put expiration; 
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Table 1: Example of the Profitability of the Synthetic Repurchase Programs: The Case of Microsoft in the 1990s 
 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
Net Income $953 $1,146 $1,453 $2,195 $3,454  $4,490 $7,785 $9,421 $7,346 $7,829 
Common stock repurchased  
(# of shares) (7) (17) (30) (41) (91) (165) (64) (210) (394) (676)
Common stock repurchased  
(dollars amount) ($250) ($331) ($698) ($1,385) ($3,101) ($2,468) ($2,950) ($4,896) ($6,074) ($6,069)
Common stock repurchased as a 
percentage of Net Income 26.23% 28.88% 48.04% 63.10% 89.78% 54.97% 37.89% 51.97% 82.68% 77.52%
Put premiums received for the 
corresponding year   $49 $124 $95  $538 $766 $472 ($1,367)
Put premiums as a percentage of  
Net Income   3.37% 5.65% 2.75% 11.98% 9.84% 5.01% -18.61%
Put premiums as a percentage of 
common stock repurchased   7.02% 8.95% 3.06% 21.80% 25.97% 9.64% -22.51%
Potential repurchase obligation end of 
year (computed as average)a   $558b $1,294b $315  $4,470 $10,106 $11,618   
Potential repurchase obligation end of 
year (# of shares)   
 
8          13            3           60        163        157  
 
Min strike price    $69.75 $95.00 $105.00  $72.00 $59.00 $70.00  
 
Max strike price    $69.75 $104.00 $105.00  $77.00 $65.00 $78.00  
 
R&D expense ($470) ($610) ($860) ($1,432) ($1,925) ($2,601) ($2,970) ($3,772) ($4,379) ($4,307)
 
This Table presents Microsoft Corporations experience with its synthetic stock repurchase program over the period 1993 through 2002. It is 
created by using information from the 10-Q and 10-K statements. All information except strike prices is in Millions. All data is annual. 
 
a Potential Repurchase obligation is computed as the average strike price multiplied by number of shares in the potential repurchase obligation 
b Potential Repurchase obligation was self reported at 10-K from Microsoft only for 1995 and 1996 correspondingly as $405 and $635 million, this 
two amounts differ form the computed from as $558 and $1,294 
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Table 2: Earnings Before Interest & Taxes (EBIT) and the t-values for comparison within 
and between the SRP set and matching samples 
Average (Earnings Before Interest & Taxes) is the mean of corresponding annual Earnings Before Interest & Taxes for 
parallel relative year for particular set; RY is relative year to the firm started synthetic repurchase; Synthetic Repurchase 
Firms is the set of 53 firms that have reported synthetic repurchase programs; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the 
comparison set of  122 industry-and-size-matched firms with stock repurchase program; (The number of control firms is less 
than 159 because several of the synthetic repurchase firms share  matched firms in common as they fall in the same 4-digit SIC 
industry and are very similar in size); Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison set of 122 industry-and-size-
matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-value for the parallel relative year between the 
corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding set; p-
value (-5,0) is the computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding set; p-value (0,5) is the computed p-
value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding set;  
























-5 $164  $158 $92 $5 $72 $66 
-4 $217  $181 $91 $35 $126 ** $90* 
-3 $249  $198 $116 $51 $134 ** $82 
-2 $298  $214 $128 $85 $171 ** $86 
-1 $381  $218 $127 $163** $255 *** $91* 
 $471  $235 $128 $236*** $343 *** $107* 
1 $539  $214 $88 $325*** $451 *** $126** 
2 $641  $222 $44 $419*** $597 *** $178***
3 $942  $214 $68 $727*** $874 *** $146** 
4 $1,350  $317 $102 $1,033*** $1,247 *** $214** 
5 $1,358  $361 $81 $997** $1,277 ** $280** 
          
 (-5,5) $1,194 *** $202 ** -$11       
 (-5,0) $307 ** $77 $36 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $887 ** $125  -$48          
xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
  
Notes:  a. Synthetic repurchase firms and control firms are matched by size at Year 0 and the three portfolios have the 
same average firm size in Year 0.  Therefore, we do not adjust reported means for a Year 0 size benchmark. 
Adjusting for subsequent years’ size would understate the performance measures for high performing firms 
and overstate the performance measures for low performing firms. 
b. The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very similar results.  
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Table 3: Total Assets and the p-values for comparison within and between the SRP firms 
set and matching samples 
Average (Assets-Total) is the mean annual total assets for parallel relative year for corresponding set; RY is relative year to the 
firm started synthetic repurchase; Synthetic Repurchase Firms is the set of 53 firms that have reported synthetic repurchase 
programs; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison set of  122 industry-and-size-matched firms with stock 
repurchase program; (The number of control firms is less than 159 because several of the synthetic repurchase firms share  
matched firms in common as they fall in the same 4-digit SIC industry and are very similar in size); Matched Firms without 
Repurchase is the comparison set of 122 industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the 
computed p-value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the computed p-
value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding set; p-value (-5,0) is the computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 
0 for corresponding set; p-value (0,5) is the computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding set;  
 

























-5 $2,017  $3,128 $2,954 -$1,111 -$937 $174 
-4 $2,139  $3,328 $2,859 -$1,190 -$721 $469 
-3 $2,275  $3,449 $3,074 -$1,173 -$798 $375 
-2 $2,678  $3,343 $3,201 -$665 -$523 $142 
-1 $3,085  $3,542 $3,467 -$457 -$381 $75 
0 $3,967  $3,947 $3,780 $20 $187 $167 
1 $4,370  $2,231 $2,752 $2,139** $1,618 -$521 
2 $4,077  $2,192 $641 $1,885* $3,436 *** $1,551***
3 $5,716  $2,073 $964 $3,643*** $4,751 *** $1,109 
4 $7,863  $1,839 $652 $6,024*** $7,211 *** $1,187** 
5 $9,322  $2,382 $698 $6,940*** $8,624 *** $1,684** 
 (-5,5) $7,305 *** -$746 -$2,256       
 (-5,0) $1,950 * $819 $826 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $5,355 ** -$1,565  -$3,082          
xxxxxxxxx xxx Xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx Xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
  
Notes: a. Synthetic repurchase firms and control firms are matched by size at Year 0 and the three portfolios have the 
same average firm size in Year 0.  Therefore, we do not adjust reported means for a Year 0 size benchmark. 
Adjusting for subsequent years’ size would understate the performance measures for high performing firms 
and overstate the performance measures for low performing firms.  
b. The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very similar results. 
 c. We checked COMPUSTAT to determine whether increases in cash and cash equivalents are primarily 
responsible for the higher levels of total assets reported for the synthetic repurchase firms. We found no 
evidence that the increases in mean total assets can be explained by increases in cash and cash equivalents. 
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Table 4: R&D Expense and the t-values for comparison within and between the SRP set 
and matching samples 
Average (R&D Expense) is the annual mean research and  development expense  for parallel relative year and corresponding 
portfolio; RY is relative year to the firm started synthetic repurchase; Synthetic Repurchase Firms is the set of 53 firms that 
have reported synthetic repurchase programs; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison set of  122 industry-and-
size-matched firms with stock repurchase program; (The number of control firms is less than 159 because several of the 
synthetic repurchase firms share  matched firms in common as they fall in the same 4-digit SIC industry and are very similar in 
size); Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison set of 122 industry-and-size-matched firms without stock 
repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-
value (-5,5) is the computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding set; p-value (-5,0) is the computed p-
value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding set; p-value (0,5) is the computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  
for corresponding set;  
 

























-5 $101  $75 $16 $26 $85 ** $59** 
-4 $102  $74 $26 $28 $76 ** $47* 
-3 $113  $69 $28 $44 $86 ** $41 
-2 $121  $67 $20 $54 $101 *** $47** 
-1 $174  $71 $21 $103** $153 *** $50** 
 $220  $76 $23 $143** $197 *** $54***
1 $268  $119 $27 $149** $241 *** $92***
2 $429  $187 $32 $242** $397 *** $155***
3 $467  $120 $23 $347*** $445 *** $98** 
4 $562  $101 $29 $460*** $532 *** $72** 
5 $546  $138 $37 $408** $509 *** $101* 
          
 (-5,5) $445 ** $63 $21       
 (-5,0) $119 $1 $7 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $326  $61  $15          
 xxxxxxxxx xxx Xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxxxx xxx
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
  
Notes:  a. Synthetic repurchase firms and control firms are matched by size at Year 0 and the three portfolios have the 
same average firm size in Year 0.  Therefore, we do not adjust reported means for a Year 0 size benchmark. 
Adjusting for subsequent years’ size would understate the performance measures for high performing firms 
and overstate the performance measures for low performing firms. 
b. The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very similar 
results. 
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Table 5: Market model event study for days (0,1) for SRP firms for four event windows 
Synthetic Repurchase Firms is the set of 53 firms that have reported synthetic repurchase programs;  
Windows Examined represent several event windows in which we assign the open market repurchase announcement to examine SRP; Initial 
Repurchase Announcement Prior to the Synthetic Window represents the first announcement of an “plain vanilla” open market repurchase program 
by firms that subsequently were involved in a synthetic program; Subsequent Repurchase Announcements Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase 
Window represents all subsequent repurchase announcements that firms have made prior to the synthetic window. This is an aggregation of all “plain 
vanilla” open market repurchase announcements before the initiation of the synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. This are new 
announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open 
market repurchase programs from firms that have already done a repurchase; Repurchase Announcements During Synthetic Repurchase Window 
represents all new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a 
completely new open market repurchase programs for the duration of synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives; Repurchase 
Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic Repurchase Window represents new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing 
open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs after the termination of a SRP. 
 # of observations is the number of observations for each event window; Average Abnormal Return is the market-model risk-adjusted average 
abnormal return; Median Abnormal Return is the market-model risk-adjusted median abnormal return; t-STAT is the student t statistic measuring the 
difference from zero of the Average Abnormal Return; P-VAL is the corresponding P-value for the T-STAT; Z-STAT is the Z statistic measuring the 
difference from zero of the Average Abnormal Return; P-VAL is the corresponding P-value for the Z-STAT; %NEG is the percentage of analyst who 
are downgrading there Earnings Forecast Revisions; %POS is the percentage of analyst who are upgrading there Earnings Forecast Revisions; 
WILCOXON T-STAT is the student t-statistic measuring the difference of the percentage of analyst who are upgrading there Earnings Forecast 
Revisions from the percentage of analyst who are downgrading there Earnings Forecast Revisions; WILCOXON P-VAL is the corresponding P-value 
for the WILCOXON T-STAT; 
 Average Median       WILCOXON 
Windows Examined # of observations Abnormal Abnormal T-STAT (P-VAL) Z-STAT (P-VAL) %NEG %POS T-STAT (P-VAL) 
 Return Return         
Initial Repurchase Announcement Prior to 
the Synthetic Window 
 
38 1.946% 1.502 2.34 (0.025) 3.57 (0.000) 32.4 67.6 2.24 (0.013) 
Subsequent Repurchase Announcements 
Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase Window 
 
35 0.603% 0.664 0.86 (0.398) 1.47 (0.143) 48.4 51.6 1.21 (0.112) 
Repurchase Announcements During 
Synthetic Repurchase Window 
 
108 1.233% 1.13 1.68 (0.096) 3.87 (0.000) 37.1 62.9 2.97 (0.001) 
Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to 
Synthetic Repurchase Window 
 
8 -1.496% -0.797 -0.71 (0.500) 0.01 (0.992) 62.5 37.5 0.42 (0.337) 
Windows Examined represents the for different event windows in which I assign the open market repurchase announcement to examine them; Initial 
Repurchase Announcement Prior to the Synthetic Window represents the first announcement of an “plain vanilla” open market repurchase program 
by firms that subsequently were involved in a synthetic program; Subsequent Repurchase Announcements Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase 
Window represents all subsequent repurchase announcements that firms have made prior to the synthetic window. This is an aggregation of all “plain 
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vanilla” open market repurchase announcements before the initiation of the synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. This are new 
announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open 
market repurchase programs from firms that have already done a repurchase; Repurchase Announcements During Synthetic Repurchase Window 
represents all new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a 
completely new open market repurchase programs for the duration of synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives; Repurchase 
Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic Repurchase Window represents new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing 
open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs after the termination of a synthetic 
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